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Abstract 
Overall efficiency measures were introduced in the literature for evaluating the economic 
performance of firms when reference prices are available. These references are usually 
observed market prices. Recently, Aparicio and Zofío (2019) have shown that the result 
of applying cross-efficiency methods (Sexton et al., 1986), yielding an aggregate 
multilateral index that compares the technical performance of firms using the shadow 
prices of competitors, can be precisely reinterpreted as a measure of economic 
efficiency. They termed the new approach ‘economic cross-efficiency’. However, these 
authors restrict their analysis to the basic definitions corresponding to the Farrell (1957) 
and Nerlove (1965) approaches, i.e., based on the duality between the cost function and 
the input distance function and between the profit function and the directional distance 
function, respectively. Here we complete their proposal by introducing new economic 
cross-efficiency measures related to other popular approaches for measuring economic 
performance. Specifically those based on the duality between the profitability (maximum 
revenue to cost) and the generalized (hyperbolic) distance function, and between the 
profit function and either the weighted additive or the Hölder distance function. 
Additionally, we introduce panel data extensions related to the so-called cost Malmquist 
index and the profit Luenberger indicator. Finally, we illustrate the models resorting to 
Data Envelopment Analysis techniquesfrom which shadow prices are obtained, and 
considering a banking industry dataset previously used in the cross-efficiency literature. 
Keywords: Data Envelopment Analysis, Overall efficiency, Cross-efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
In a recent contribution, Aparicio and Zofío (2019) link the notions of overall economic 
efficiency and cross-efficiency by introducing the concept of economic cross-efficiency. 
Overall economic efficiency compares optimal and actual economic performance. From 
a cost perspective and following Farrell (1957), cost efficiency is the ratio of minimum to 
actual (observed) cost, conditional on a certain quantity of output and input prices. From 
a profit perspective, Chambers et al. (1998) define the so-called Nerlovian inefficiency 
as the normalized difference between maximum profit and actual (observed) profit, 
conditional on both output and input prices.  
Cost and profit efficiencies can in turn be decomposed into technical and allocative 
efficiencies by resorting to duality theory. In the former case, it can be shown that 
Shephard input distance function is dual to the cost function and, for any reference 
prices, cost efficiency is always smaller or equal to the value of the input distance function 
(Färe and Primont, 1995). Consequently, as the distance function can be regarded as a 
measure of technical efficiency, whatever (residual) difference may exist between the 
two can be attributed to allocative efficiency. Likewise, in the case of profit inefficiency, 
Chambers et al. (1998) show that the directional distance function introduced by 
Luenberger (1992) is dual to the profit function and, for any reference prices, 
(normalized) maximum profit minus observed profit is always greater than or equal to the 
directional distance function. Again, since the directional distance function can be 
regarded a measure of technical inefficiency, any difference corresponds to allocative 
inefficiency.  
In this evaluation framework of economic performance, the reference output and 
input prices play a key role. In applied studies, the use of market prices allows studying 
the economic performance of firms empirically. However, in the duality approach just 
summarized above, reference prices correspond to those shadow prices that equate the 
supporting economic functions (cost and profit functions) to their duals (input or 
directional distance functions). Yet there are many other alternative reference prices, 
such as those that are assigned to each particular observation when calculating the input 
and directional distance functions in empirical studies. An example are the optimal 
weights that are obtained when solving the ‘multiplier’ formulations of Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) programs that, approximating the production technology, yield the values 
of the technical efficiencies.  
This set of weights can be used to cross-evaluate the technical performance of a 
particular observation with respect to its counterparts. I.e., rather than using its own 
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weights, the technical efficiency of an observation can be re-evaluated using the weights 
corresponding to other units.1 This constitutes the basis of the cross-efficiency methods 
initiated by Sexton et al. (1986). Taking the mean of all bilateral cross-evaluations using 
the vector of all (individual) optimal weights results in the cross-efficiency measure. 
Aparicio and Zofío (2019) realized that if these weights were brought into the duality 
analysis underlying economic efficiency, by considering them as specific shadow prices, 
the cross-efficiency measure can be consistently reinterpreted as a measure of 
economic efficiency and, consequently, could be further decomposed into technical and 
allocative efficiencies. 
In particular, and under the customary assumption of input homotheticity (see 
Aparicio and Zofío, 2019), cross-efficiency analysis based on the shadow prices obtained 
when calculating the input distance function results in the definition of the Farrell cost 
cross-efficiency. Likewise, it is possible to define the Nerlovian profit cross-inefficiency 
considering the vector of optimal shadow prices obtained when calculating the directional 
distance function. One fundamental advantage of the new approach based on shadow 
prices is that these measures are well defined under the assumption of variable returns 
to scale; i.e., they always range between zero and one, in contrast to conventional cross-
efficiency methods that may result in negative values. This drawback of the cross-
efficiency methodology is addressed by Lim and Zhu (2015), who devise an ad-hoc 
method to solve it, based on the translation of the data. The proposal by Aparicio and 
Zofío (2019) also takes care of the anomaly effortlessly, while opening a new research 
path that connects the economic efficiency and cross-efficiency literatures.  
This chapter follows-up this new avenue of research by extending the economic 
cross-efficiency model to a number of multiplicative and additive definitions of economic 
behavior and their associated technological duals. From an economic perspective this is 
quite relevant since rather than minimizing cost or maximizing profit, and due to market, 
managerial or technological constraints, firms may be interested, for example, in 
maximizing revenue or maximizing profitability. As the economic goal is different, the 
underlying duality that allows a consistent measurement of economic cross-efficiency is 
different. For example, for the revenue function, the dual representation of the technology 
is the output distance function (Shephard, 1953), while for the profitability function it is 
the generalized distance function (Zofío and Prieto, 2006). Moreover, since the 
generalized distance function nests the input and output distance functions as particular 
                                               
1 This cross-efficiency evaluation with respect to alternative peers results in smaller technical 
efficiency scores, because DEA searches for the most favorable weights when performing own 
evaluations. 
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cases (as well as the hyperbolic distance function), we can relate the cost, revenue and 
profitability cross-efficiency models. Also, since a duality relationship may exist between 
a given supporting economic function and several distance functions, alternative 
economic cross-efficiency models may co-exist. We explore this situation for the profit 
function. Besides the already mentioned model for profit efficiency measurement and its 
decomposition based on the directional distance function, an alternative evaluation can 
be performance relying on the weighted additive distance function (Cooper et al., 2011) 
or the Hölder distance function (Briec and Lesours, 1999). We present these last two 
models and compare them to the one based on the directional distance function. We 
remark the results of these models differ because of the alternative normalizing 
constraints that the duality relationship imposes. Hence researchers and practitioners 
need to decide first on the economic approach that is relevant for their study: cost, 
revenue, profit, profitability, and then, among the set of suitable distance functions 
complying with the required duality conditions, choose the one that better characterizes 
the production process. Related to the DEA methods that we consider in this chapter to 
implement the economic cross—efficiency models, it is well-known that the use of radial 
(multiplicative) distance functions project observations to subsets of the production 
possibility set that are not Pareto-efficient because non-radial input reductions and output 
increases may be feasible (i.e., slacks). As for additive distance functions, the use of the 
weighted additive distance function in a DEA context ensures that efficiency is measured 
against the strongly efficient subset of the production possibility set, while its directional 
and Hölder counterparts do not. Thus, the choice of distance function is also critical when 
interpreting results. For example, in the event that slacks are prevalent, this source of 
technical inefficiency will be confounded with allocative inefficiency when decomposing 
profit inefficiency. Of course, other alternative models of economic cross-efficiency could 
be developed in terms of alternative distance functions. And some of them could even 
generalize the proposals presented here, such as the profit model based on the loss 
distance function introduced by Aparicio et al. (2016), which nests all the above additive 
functions.  
Finally, in this chapter we also extend the economic cross-efficiency model to a panel 
data setting where firms are observed over time. For this we rely on existing models that 
decompose cost or profit change into productivity indices or indicators based on 
quantities, i.e., the Malmquist productivity index or Luenberger productivity indicator, and 
their counterpart price formulations. As the Malmquist index or Luenberger indicator can 
be further decomposed into efficiency change and technological change components, 
we can further learn about the sources of cost or profit change. As for the price indices 
5 
 
and indicators, they can also be decomposed so as to learn about the role played by 
allocative efficiency. We relate this panel data framework to the cross-efficiency model 
and, by doing so, introduce the concept of economic cross-efficiency change. In this 
model the cost-Malmquist and profit-Luenberger definitions proposed by Maniadakis and 
Thanassoulis (2004) and Juo et al. (2015), using market prices to determine cost change 
and profit change, are modified following the economic cross-efficiency rationale. that 
replaces the former by the set of shadow prices corresponding to all observations, which 
results in a complete evaluation of the economic performance observations over timeto 
the extent that a complete set of alternative prices is considered.     
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we introduce the notation 
and recall the economic cross-efficiency model proposed by Aparicio and Zofío (2019). 
In the third section we present the duality results that allow us to extend the analytical 
framework to the notion of profitability cross-efficiency based on the generalized distance 
function, and how it relates to the partially oriented Farrell cost and revenue cross-
efficiencies. We also introduce two alternative models of profit cross-efficiency based on 
the weighted-additive and Hölder distance functions. A first proposal of economic cross-
inefficiency for panel data models based on the cost-Malmquist index and profit-
Luenberger indicator is propose in section four. In section five we illustrate the empirical 
implementation of the existing and new definitions of economic cross-efficiency through 
Data Envelopment Analysis and using a dataset of bank branches previously used in the 
literature. Finally, relevant conclusions are drawn in section six, along with future venues 
of research in this field. 
 
2. Background 
In this section, we briefly introduce the notion of (standard) cross-efficiency in Data 
Envelopment Analysis and review the concept of economic cross-efficiency. Let us 
consider a set of n observations (e.g., firms or decision making units, DMUs) that use m 
inputs, whose (non-negative) quantities are represented by the vector   1,..., mX x x , to 
produce s outputs, whose (non-negative) quantities are represented by the vector 
 1,..., sY y y . The set of data is denoted as   , , 1,..., .j jX Y j n  The technology or 
production possibility set is defined, in general, as 
  , :  can produce Ym sT X Y R X  . 
6 
 
Relaying on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques, T is approximated as 
 
1 1
, : , , , , 0,
n n
m s
c j ij i j rj r j
j j
T X Y R x x i y y r j  
 
 
        
 
  . This corresponds to a 
production possibility set characterized by constant returns to scale (CRS). Allowing for 
variable returns to scale (VRS) results in the following definition: 
 
1 1 1
, : , , , , 1, 0,
n n n
m s
v j ij i j rj r j j
j j j
T X Y R x x i y y r j   
  
 
         
 
   see Banker et al. 
(1984).2  
Let us now introduce the notion of Farrell cross-efficiency. 
2.1 Farrell (cost) cross-efficiency 
In DEA, for firm k the radial input technical efficiency assuming CRS is calculated 
through the following program: 
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Although (1) is a fractional problem, it can be linearized as shown by Charnes et al. 
(1978).  ,c k kITE X Y  ranges between zero and one. Hereinafter, we denote the optimal 
solution obtained when solving (1) as  * *,k kV U .  
                                               
2 Based on these technological characterizations, in what follows we define several measures 
that allow the decomposition of economic cross-efficiency into technical and allocative 
components. As it is now well-established in the literature, we rely on the following terminology: 
We refer to the different factors in which economic cross-efficiency can be decomposed 
multiplicatively as efficiency measures (e.g., Farrell cost efficiency). Numerically, the greater their 
value, the more efficient observations are. For these measures one is the upper bound signaling 
an efficient behavior. Alternatively, we refer to the different terms in which economic cross-
inefficiency can be decomposed additively as inefficiency measures (e.g., Nerlovian profit 
inefficiency). Now the greater their numerical value, the greater the inefficiency, with zero being 
the lower bound associated to an efficient behavior.        
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Model (1) allows firms to choose their own weights on inputs and outputs in order to 
maximize the ratio of a weighted (virtual) sum of outputs to a weighted (virtual) sum of 
inputs. In this manner, the assessed observation is evaluated in the most favorable way 
and DEA provides a self-evaluation of the observation by using input and output weights 
that are unit-specific. Unfortunately, this fact hinders obtaining a suitable ranking of firms 
based on their efficiency score; particularly for efficient observations whose  ,c k kITE X Y   
 1. In contrast to standard DEA, a cross-evaluation strategy is suggested in the literature 
(Sexton et al., 1986, and Doyle and Green, 1994). In particular, the (bilateral) cross input 
technical efficiency of unit l with respect to unit k is defined by 
  

 



*
*
1
*
*
1
, .
s
rk rl
k l r
c l l m
k l
ik il
i
u yU YCITE X Y k
V X v x
 (2) 
 ,c l lCITE X Y k  also takes values between zero and one, and satisfies 
   , ,c l l c l lCITE X Y l ITE X Y .3 
Given the observed n units in the data sample, the traditional literature on cross-
efficiency postulates the aggregation of the bilateral cross input technical efficiencies of 
unit l with respect to all units k, k = 1,…,n, through the arithmetic mean. This results in 
the definition of the multilateral notion of cross input technical efficiency of unit l: 
    
  

  


  

*
*
1
*
*1 1 1
1
1 1 1, , .
s
rk rln n n
k l r
c l l c l l m
k k kk l
ik il
i
u yU YCITE X Y CITE X Y k
n n nV X v x
 (3) 
Before presenting the notion of economic cross-efficiency, we need to briefly recall 
the main concepts related to the measurement of economic efficiency through frontier 
analysis, both in multiplicative form (Farrell, 1957) and in additive manner (Chambers et 
al., 1998). We start considering the Farrell radial paradigm for measuring and 
decomposing cost efficiency. For the sake of brevity, we state our discussion in the input 
space, defining the input requirement set L(Y) as the set of non-negative inputs mX R  
that can produce non-negative output sY R , formally  L Y  =   : X,Y ,mX R T   
and the isoquant of   :L Y  =      : 1 .X L Y x L Y      Let us also 
                                               
3 For a list of relevant properties see Aparicio and Zofío (2019). 
 IsoqL Y
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denote by  ,LC Y W  the minimum cost of producing the output level Y given the input 
market price vector mW R :    
1
, min :
m
L i i
i
C Y W w x X L Y

   
 
 . 
The standard (multiplicative) Farrell approach views cost efficiency as originating 
from technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. Specifically, we have: 
 
   
Allocative Efficiency
Technical Efficiency1
Cost Efficiency
, 1 , ;
,
L F
Lm I
L
i i
i
C Y W
AE X Y W
D X Yw x

 
 

, (4) 
 
where     , sup 0 : /ILD X Y X L Y     is the Shephard input distance function 
(Shephard, 1953) and allocative efficiency is defined residually. We use the subscript L 
to denote that we do not assume a specific type of returns to scale. Nevertheless, we 
will refer to  ,cC Y W  and  ,IcD X Y  for CRS, and  ,vC Y W  and  ,IvD X Y  for variable 
returns to scale (VRS) when needed. Additionally, it is well-known in DEA that the inverse 
of  ,ILD X Y  coincides with  ,L k kITE X Y . For the particular case of CRSprogram (1): 
 ,c k kITE X Y =  1,IcD X Y .  
Considering actual common market prices for all firms within an industry, then the 
natural way of comparing the performance of each one would be using the left-hand side 
in (4). We then could assess the obtained values for each firm since we were using the 
same reference weights (prices) for all the observations, creating a market based 
ranking. This idea inspired Aparicio and Zofío (2019), who suggest that cross-efficiency 
in DEA could be also defined based on the notion of Farrell’s cost efficiency. In particular, 
for a given set of any reference prices (e.g., shadow prices, market prices or other 
imputed prices), they define the Farrell (cost) cross-efficiency of unit l with respect to unit 
k as 
   
*
*
1
,
, ,L l kL l l m
ik il
i
C Y V
FCE X Y k
v x



 (5) 
where L{c,v} denotes either constant or variable returns to scale. 
As in (4),      
*1, , ;
,
F
L l l L l l k
L l l
FCE X Y k AE X Y V
D X Y
  . Therefore, Farrell cross-
efficiency of unit l with respect to unit k corrects the usual technical efficiency, the inverse 
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of the Shephard distance function, through a term with meaning of (shadow) allocative 
efficiency. 
Given the observed n units, the traditional literature on cross-efficiency suggests to 
aggregate bilateral cross-efficiencies through the arithmetic mean to obtain the 
multilateral notion of cross efficiency. In the case of the Farrell cross-efficiency this yields: 
     
*
*1 1
1
,1 1, , .
n n
L l k
L l l L l l m
k k
ik il
i
C Y V
FCE X Y FCE X Y k
n n v x 

  

 
 
(6) 
 
Additionally,  ,L l lFCE X Y  can be always decomposed (under any returns to scale) 
into (radial) technical efficiency and a correction factor defined as the arithmetic mean of 
n shadow allocative efficiency terms. I.e.,  
         
*
*
*1 1 1
1
,1 1 1, , , , ; ,
n n n
L l k F
L l l L l l L l l L l l km
k k k
ik il
i
C Y V
FCE X Y FCE X Y k ITE X Y AE X Y V
n n nv x  

     

(7) 
with  ,L l lITE X Y  and  *, ;FL l l kAE X Y V , L{c,v}, denoting constant and variable returns to 
scale technical and (shadow) allocative efficiencies, respectively. 
We note that  ,L l lFCE X Y  satisfies two very interesting properties: 
First, assuming the existence of perfectly competitive input markets resulting in a 
single equilibrium price for each input (i.e., firms are price takers), if we substitute 
(shadow) prices by these market prices in (7), then   ,L l lFCE X Y  precisely coincides 
with  
1
,
m
L l i il
i
C Y W w x

 , which is Farrell’s measure of cost inefficiency (4). Hence, 
economic cross-efficiency offers a ‘natural’ counterpart to consistently rank units when 
reference prices are unique for all units. This property is not satisfied in general by the 
standard measure of cross-efficiency, if both input and output market prices are used as 
weights; i.e.,    1
1 1
,
,
s
r rl
c lr
c l l m m
i il i il
i i
p y C Y W
CITE X Y
w x w x

 
 

 
. Indeed Aparicio and Zofío (2019) 
show that besides market prices, input homotheticity is required for the equality to hold; 
otherwise    , ,c l l c l lCITE X Y FCE X Y . Nevertheless, we also remark that the concept 
of economic cross-efficiency can accommodate firm-specific market prices if some 
degree of market power exists and firms are price makers in the inputs markets. In that 
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case individual firms’ shadow prices would be substituted by their market counterparts 
in (7). This connects our proposal to the extensive theoretical and empirical economic 
efficiency literature considering individual market prices, e.g., Ali and Seiford (1993).     
Second, as previously remarked,  ,L l lFCE X Y  is well-defined, ranging between zero 
and one, even under variable returns to scale. This property is not verified in general by 
the standard cross-efficiency measures (see Wu et al., 2009, Lim and Zhu, 2015). This 
is quite relevant because traditional measures may yield negative values under variable 
returns to scale, which is inconsistent and hinders the extension of cross-efficiency 
methods to technologies characterized by VRS.  
An interesting by-product of the economic cross-efficiency approach is that by 
incorporating the economic behavior of firms in the formulations (e.g., cost minimizers in 
 ,v l lFCE X Y ), the set of weights represented by the shadow prices are reinterpreted as 
market prices, rather than their usual reading in terms of the alternative supporting 
technological hyperplanes that they define, and against which technical inefficiency is 
measured. This solves some recent criticism raised against the cross-efficiency 
methods, since shadow prices could be then considered as specific realizations of 
market prices, e.g., see Førsund (2018a, 2018b) and Olesen (2018). 
Next, we briefly introduce the Nerlovian cross-inefficiency. 
2.1 Nerlovian (profit) cross-inefficiency 
Now, we recall the concepts of profit inefficiency and its dual graph measure 
corresponding to the directional distance function (Chambers et al., 1998).  
Given the vector of input and output market prices  , m sW P R  , and the production 
possibility set T, the profit function is defined as 
   
, 1 1
, max : , .
s m
T r r i iX Y r i
W P p y w x X Y T
 
     
 
   In what follows, let   ,c W P  and 
 ,v W P  be the maximum profit given the CRS technology Tc  and the VRS technology 
Tv, respectively. 
Profit inefficiency à la Nerlove for firm k is defined as maximum profit (i.e., the value 
of the profit function given market prices) minus observed profit, normalized by the value 
of a pre-fixed reference vector  ,x y m sG G R  . By duality, the following inequality is 
obtained  (Chambers et al., 1998): 
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where    

     

, ; , max : ( , )x y x yT k k k kD X Y G G X G Y G T  is the directional distance 
function. As for the Farrell approach, profit inefficiency can be also decomposed into 
technical inefficiency and allocative inefficiency, where the former corresponds to the 
directional distance function:  
 
    
 
       

 
 
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r i x y N x y
T k k T k ks m
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r r i i
r i
W P p y w x
D X Y G G AI X Y W P G G
p g w g
  (9) 
The subscript T in   , ,T W P   

, ; ,x yT k kD X Y G G  and  , ; , ; ,N x yT k kAI X Y W P G G  
implies that we do not assume a specific type of returns to scale. Nevertheless, as before 
we will use   , ; ,x yc k kD X Y G G  and  , ; , ; ,N x yc k kAI X Y W P G G  for CRS and 
  , ; ,x yv k kD X Y G G  and  , ; , ; ,N x yv k kAI X Y W P G G  for VRS. 
In the case of DEA, when VRS is assumed, the directional distance function is 
determined through (10): 
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
 




,
1
1
1
, ; ,
. , 1,..., ,
, 1,..., ,
1,
0, 1,..., .
x y
v k k
n
x
j ij ik i
j
n
y
j rj rk r
j
n
j
j
j
D X Y G G max
s t x x g i m
y y g r s
j n
                            (10) 
whose dual is: 
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  
   
 
 
 
 
 
, , 1 1
1 1
1 1
. . 0, 1,..., ,
1,
0 , 0 .
s m
r rk i ikU V r i
s m
r rj i ij
r i
s m
y x
r r i i
r i
s m
min u y v x
s t u y v x j n
u g v g
U V
 
 
  (11) 
 
Let also denote the optimal solutions of problem (11) as  * * *, , .k k kV U     
Aparicio and Zofío (2019) defined the Nerlovian cross-inefficiency of unit l with 
respect to unit k as: 
 
 
  
   
   
              
 
   
   
     
   
* * * * * * *
1 1 1 1
* * * *
1 1 1 1
,
, ; , .
s m s m
k k rk rl ik il k rk rl ik il
r i r ix y
v l l s m s m
y x y x
rk r ik i rk r ik i
r i r i
V U u y v x u y v x
NCI X Y G G k
u g v g u g v g
 
 
(12) 
 
As usual, the arithmetic mean of (12) for all observed units yields the final Nerlovian 
cross-inefficiency of unit l: 
   
1
1, ; , , ; , .
n
x y x y
v l l v l l
k
NCI X Y G G NCI X Y G G k
n 
   
 
(13) 
 
Invoking (9), we observed once again that the Nerlovian cross-inefficiency of firm l is 
a ‘correction’ of the original directional distance function value for the unit under 
evaluation, where the modifying factor can be interpreted as (shadow) allocative 
inefficiency: 
     * *0 0
1
1, ; , , ; , , ; , ; , .
n
x y x y N x y
v l l v v l l k k
k
NCI X Y G G D X Y G G AI X Y V U G G
n 
  
    (14) 
Finally, these authors showed that the approach by Ruiz (2013), based on the 
directional distance function under CRS, is a particular case of (14). 
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3. New economic cross-(in)efficiency measures 
 
3.1 Profitability cross-efficiency  
We now extend the previous framework of economic cross-(in)efficiency to a set of 
new measures which can be decomposed either multiplicatively or additively. We start 
with the notion of profitability―corresponding to Georgescu-Roegen's (1951) ‘return to 
the dollar’, defined as the ratio of observed revenue to observed cost. We then show that 
it can be decomposed into a measure of economic efficiency represented by the 
generalized distance function introduced by Chavas and Cox (1999), and a factor defined 
as the geometric mean of the allocative efficiencies corresponding to the n shadow 
prices. Let us define maximum profitability as   ,T W P   
 
 
  
 
 , 1 1/ : , .
s m
r r i iX Y r i
max p y w x X Y T Zofío and Prieto (2006) proved that 
   
  

, ;
,
Gk k
c k k
T
P Y W X D X Y
W P
, (15) 
where          1, ; inf : ( , / )Gc k k k kD X Y X Y T ,  0 1, is the generalized distance 
function and 

 
1
s
k r rk
r
P Y p y  and 

 
1
m
k i ik
i
W X w x .  
We remark that the generalized distance function in expression (15), rather than 
being defined to allow for either constant or variable returns to scale as in the previous 
models, is characterized by the former. The reason is that the production technology 
exhibits local constant returns to scale at the optimum; hence maximum profitability is 
achieved at loci representing most productive scale sizes in Banker et al. (1984) 
terminology. This provides the rationale to develop the duality underlying expression (15) 
departing from such technological specification. We further justify this choice in what 
follows when recalling the variable returns to scale technology so as to account for scale 
efficiency.  
The generalized distance function  , ;Gc k kD X X  can be calculated relying on 
DEA by solving the following non-linear problem:   
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
 
 
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



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
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c k k
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j ij ik
j
n
rk
j rj
j
j
D X Y min
s t
x x i m
yy r s
j n
        (16) 
Following the Farrell and Nerlovian decompositions (7) and (14), it is possible to 
define allocative efficiency as a residual from expression (15):  
      
   

, ; , ; , ; ,
,
G Gk k
c k k c k k
T
P Y W X D X Y AE X Y W P
W P
      (17) 
where    
 

ˆ ˆ/, ; , ;
,
G k k
c K K
T
P Y W XAE X Y W P
W P
 with  ˆ , ;Gk c k k kX D X Y X  and 
 ˆ , ;Gk k c k kY Y D X Y .4 So, allocative efficiency, which is a measure that in the Farrell 
approach essentially captures the comparison of the rate of substitution between 
production inputs with the ratio of market prices at the production isoquant given the 
output level kY , is, in this case, the profitability calculated at the (efficient) projection 
linked to the generalized model. 
As previously mentioned, since the technology may be characterized by variable 
returns to scale, it is possible to bring its associated directional distance function 
 , ;Gv k kD X X  into (17)calculated as in (16) but adding the VRS constraint  1n jj  = 
1. This allows decomposing productive efficiency into two factors, one representing ‘pure’ 
VRS technical efficiency and a second one capturing scale efficiency: i.e.,  , ;Gc k kD X X  
     , ; , ; ,G Gv k k k kD X X SE X X  where  , ;G k kSE X X   
    , ; / , ;G Gc k k v k kD X X D X X . Defining expression (15) under constant returns to scale 
enables us to individualize the contribution that scale efficiency makes to profitability 
efficiency. Otherwise, had we directly relied on the directional distance function defined 
                                               
4 Färe et al. (2002) defined this relationship in terms of the hyperbolic distance function; i.e.,
 ,Hc k kD X Y        
 
    
 
 , 1 1: , , 0, 1,...,
n n
k
j j k j j jz j j
Ymin X X Y j n .   
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under variable returns to scale in (15), scale inefficiency would had been confounded 
with allocative efficiency in (17). 
Reinterpreting the left hand side of (15) in the framework of cross-efficiency, we next 
define a new economic cross-efficiency approach that allows us to compare the 
(bilateral) performance of firms l with respect firm k using the notion of profitability:  
   
 

* *
* *, ; ,,
k l k l
c l l
T k k
U Y V XPCE X Y k
V U
  (18) 
where, once again,   * *,k kV U  are the shadow prices associated with the frontier 
projections generated by  , ;Gc k kD X X .  
To aggregate all cross-efficiencies in a multiplicative framework we depart on this 
occasion from standard practice and use the geometric mean, whose properties make 
the aggregation meaningful when consistent (transitive) bilateral comparisons of 
performance in terms of productivity are pursued, see Aczél and Roberts (1989) and 
Balk et al. (2017). Hence: 
    
   
  

1
* *
* *
1
, ; ,
,
n
n
k l k l
c l l
k T k k
U Y V XPCE X Y
V U
 
 
(19) 
 
As in the Farrell and Nerlovian models (7) and (14), we can decompose 
 , ;c l lPCE X Y  according to technical and allocative criteria, thereby obtaining:   
       

    
 

1/
* *
1
, ; , ; , ; , ;
nn
G G
c l l c k k c k k k k
k
PCE X Y D X Y AE X Y V U  
 
(20) 
Based on this decomposition, the role played by VRS technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency can be further individualized since  , ;GC k kD X X   
    , ; , ;G Gv k k k kD X X SE X X .   
We now obtain some relevant relationships between the profit and profitability cross-
(in)efficiencies. Relaying on Färe et al. (2002) and Zofío and Prieto (2006), it is possible 
to show that under constant returns to scale, maximum feasible profit is zero,   ,c W P  
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 0 (if    ,c W P ), and, therefore, maximum profitability is one,   ,c W P  1.5 Also, 
it is a well-known result that, under CRS,    , , ; 0Gc k k c k kITE X Y D X Y .6 Combining both 
conditions, it is possible to express (17) as follows: 
     

, , ; , ; 0 .Gk c k k c k k
k
P Y ITE X Y AE X Y W P
W X
 
 
(21) 
 
Now, in the usual cross-efficiency context considering k’s shadow prices  * *,k kV U
when evaluating the performance of firm l , we first have that the standard input oriented 
bilateral cross-efficiency can be interpreted as a profitability measure:  
   
*
*,
k l
c l l
k l
U YCITE X Y k
V Y
. Second,  



*
*
1
1,
n
k l
c l l
k k l
U YCITE X Y
n V X
 is the arithmetic mean of 
the n individual profitabilities [see (3)]. Additionally, by (21), we obtain the following 
decomposition of  , :c l lCITE X Y  
     
 
        
 
*
* *
*
1 1
1 1, , , ; , ; 0 .
n n
Gk l
c l l c l l c l l k k
k kk l
U YCITE X Y ITE X Y AE X Y V U
n nV X
 (22) 
Hence, under the assumption of CRS,  ,c l lCITE X Y can be decomposed as 
 ,L l lFCE X Y  into two technical and allocative factors, expression (7). Indeed, CRS 
implies that the production technology is input-homothetic and Aparicio and Zofío (2019) 
show in their Theorem 1 that in this (less restrictive) case,  ,c l lCITE X Y    ,c l lFCE X Y
, and therefore (22) coincides with (7). Consequently, as in the latter expression, the 
classical input cross-inefficiency measure is equal to the self-appraisal score of firm l,  
 ,c l lITE X Y , modified by the mean of its (shadow) generalized-allocative efficiencies. 
Note also that, as per (20), technical efficiency can be decomposed into VRS and scale 
efficiencies:         , , ,Fc l l v l l l lITE X Y ITE X Y SE X Y .   
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that the profit and profitability dualities and their 
associated economic cross-inefficiencies, including their decompositions, can be directly 
                                               
5 Aparicio and Zofío (2019) show in their Lemma 2 that given an optimal solution to problem (1), 
 * *,k kV U , then   * *,c k kV U   0, i.e., maximum profit equal to infinitum can be discarded. 
6 In terms of the hyperbolic distance function,  ,c k kITE X Y    2,Hc k kD X Y . 
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related in the case of CRS. Following Färe et al. (2002:673), the precursor of expression 
(15) in terms of the profit function is: 
     

 
   1, , ;
, ;
Gl
T c l l lG
c l l
P YW P D X Y W X
D X Y
. (23) 
Since   , 0T W P  in the case of CRS, expression (15) is easily derived from (23) 
and vice versa. However, under VRS,   ,T W P  is not nil and we cannot obtain the 
duality based inequality (15), with the left-hand side not depending on any efficiency 
measure (distance function) and the right-hand side not depending on prices. This 
shows, once again, the importance of defining multiplicative economic cross-efficiency 
measures under the assumption of VRS.   
3.2 Farrell (revenue) cross-efficiency 
Following the same procedure set out to define the Farrell (cost) cross-efficiency, 
 ,L l lFCE X Y in (6), we can develop an output-oriented approach in terms of the radial 
output technical efficiency,  ,c k kOTE X Y under CRS calculated through a DEA program 
corresponding to the inverse of (1)see Ali and Seiford (1993), and the revenue 
function. As usual,  ,v k kOTE X Y  may be computed under VRS adding the constraint 



1
1
n
j
j
. 
The standard output technical cross-efficiency of l based on the optimal 
weightsshadow pricesof k,  * *,k kV U , defines as:  
 
*
*
1
*
*
1
, ,
m
ik il
k l i
c l l s
k l
rk rl
r
v xV XCOTE X Y k
U Y u y


 



 (24) 
The introduction of the Farrell (revenue) cross-efficiency requires defining the 
output requirement set P(X) as the set of non-negative outputs sY R  that can be 
produced with non-negative inputs mX R , formally  P X  =   : X,Y ,sY R T   and 
the isoquant of   :P X    :Isoq P X =     : 1 .Y P X Y P X      Let us also 
denote by  ,LR X P  the maximum revenue obtained from using input level X given the 
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output market price vector sP R :    

   
 

1
, max :
s
L s sY i
R X P p y Y P X . The standard 
revenue definition and decomposition is given by: 
 
   

 
 

Allocative Efficiency
Technical Efficiency1
Revenue Efficiency
, 1 , ;
,
L F
Ls O
L
s s
i
R X P
AE X Y P
D X Yp y
, (25) 
 
where        , inf 0: /OLD X Y Y P X  is the Shephard output distance function 
(Shephard, 1953) and allocative efficiency is defined residually. Again, we use the 
subscript L to stress that revenue efficiency can be defined with respect to different 
returns to scale.  
Consequently, considering shadow prices, the Farrell (revenue) cross-efficiency of 
firm l with respect to firm k is:   
     

 
 
* *
*
*
1
, ,
, ,L l k L l kL l l s
k l
rk rl
r
R X U R X U
FRE X Y k
U Y u y
 (26) 
with L{c,v} denoting constant and variable returns to scale, respectively. 
As in (25),       
*1, , ;
,
F
L l l L l l kO
L l l
FRE X Y k AE X Y U
D X Y
. Therefore, Farrell revenue 
cross-efficiency corrects the usual technical efficiency, the inverse of Shephard output 
distance function, through a term capturing (shadow) allocative efficiency. 
As in the case of the Farrell cost cross-efficiency (6), we could aggregate all 
individual revenue cross-efficiencies following the standard approach that relies on the 
arithmetic mean. However, in the current multiplicative framework, we rely on our 
preferred choice for the geometric mean, already used in the profitability approach. This 
yields  
     
 
           
 
11 *
*
1 1
,
, , ,
nnn n
L l k
L l l L l l
k k k l
R X U
FRE X Y FRE X Y k
U Y
 (27) 
which can be further decomposed into technical and allocative components: 
             
 
            
 
1 1/*
*
*
1 1
,
, , , ; .
n nn n
L l k F
L l l L l l L l l k
k kk l
R X U
FRE X Y OTE X Y AE X Y U
U Y
           (28) 
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We now combine the cost and revenue approaches of economic cross-efficiency 
and relate it to the profitability cross-efficiency definition. Assume first that the 
 ,L l lFCE X Y  in (6) is defined using the geometric mean as aggregatorso it is 
consistent with  ,L l lFRE X Y  in (27). Then, given that  ,L l lFCE X Y  depends on 
(shadow) input prices but not on (shadow) output prices, and vice versa for 
 , ,L l lFRE X Y  we suggest to mix both approaches to introduce yet another new cross-
efficiency measure under the Farrell paradigm.  
    
 
 
   
   
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      
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 
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(29) 
 ,L l lFE X Y  is related to  ,c l lCITE X Y k  under CRS: 
 
 
 
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 
 
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 (30) 
The value of (30) must be close to 
   
 
      
   
 
1/ 1/
* *
1 1
, , .
n nn n
c l T k k
k k
CITE X Y k V U  (31) 
Additionally,  ,L l lFE X Y  always takes values between zero and one, while 
    
,
,
,
L l l
L l l
L l l
ITE X Y
FE X Y
OTE X Y
, under any returns to scale assumed. 
At this point, it is worth mentioning that analogous results to the Farrell cost cross-
efficiency can be derived for the cross output technical efficiency and revenue efficiency 
when output-homotheticity is assumed; i.e.,    , ,c l l c l lCOTE X Y k FRE X Y k . 
However,    , ,c l l c l lCOTE X Y FRE X Y  in general if  ,c l lCOTE X Y  is defined as usual 
by additive aggregation and  ,c l lFRE X Y  is defined through multiplicative aggregation. 
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3.3. Profit cross-inefficiency based on the (weighted) additive distance function 
This section introduces a measure of economic cross-efficiency based on the 
weighted additive distance function, which constitutes an alternative to the Nerlovian 
definition based on the directional distance function.  
Cooper et al. (2011) proved that 
 
  
      
 
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WA X Y A B
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where 
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 
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j j m s
j
WA X Y A B A S B H x x s i y h y
j n S H
 (33) 
is the weighted additive model in DEA. In particular, Ak and Bk are pre-fixed input and 
output weights, respectively. As in the Nerlovian approach (8), the left hand side of (32) 
measures profit inefficiency, defined as maximum profit (i.e., the value of the profit 
function at the market prices) minus observed profit, normalized by the minimum of the 
ratios of market prices to their corresponding pre-fixed weights. Based on (32), and 
assuming variable returns to scale, profit inefficiency for firm k can be decomposed as 
follows:  
 
    
       
 
 
 
 
1 1
1 1
1 1
,
, ; , , ; , ; , .
min ,..., , ,...,
s m
V r rk i ik
r i W
v k k k k V k k k k
sm
k mk k sk
W P p y w x
WA X Y A B AI X Y W P A B
pw w p
a a b b
 (34) 
 
Substituting market prices by shadow prices7 in evaluating firm l with respect to firm 
k, we obtain: 
                                               
7 Shadow prices are obtained for DMUk through the linear dual of program (33). 
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. (35) 
Aggregating all profit cross-inefficiencies through the arithmetic meangiven the 
additive framework, allows us to define the new profit cross-inefficiency measure based 
on the weighted additive approach: 
 
 
 

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1 1
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1 1 1
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min ,..., , ,...,
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v k k rk rl ik iln
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v l l l l
k skk mk k
l ml l sl
V U u y v x
WACI X Y A B
n uv v u
a a b b
,       (36) 
which can be decomposed as (34), yielding   
     

   * *
1
1, ; , , ; , , ; , ; ,
n
W
v l l l l v l l l l V l l k k l l
k
WACI X Y A B WA X Y A B AI X Y V U A B
n
.      (37) 
Therefore  , ; ,T l l l lWACI X Y A B  coincides with the sum of the original technical 
inefficiency measure of firm l , determined by the weighted additive model, and a 
correction factor capturing (shadow) allocative inefficiencies. 
It is worth mentioning that, among all the approaches mentioned in this chapter, the 
weighted additive model is the unique such that measures technical efficiency with 
respect to the strongly efficient frontier, resorting to the notion of Pareto-Koopmans 
efficiency. 
3.4. Profit cross-inefficiency measure based on the Hölder distance function 
In this section we introduce a profit cross-inefficiency measure based on the Hölder 
distance function, thereby relating two streams of the literature: cross efficiency and least 
distance. Hölder distance functions were firstly introduced with the aim of relating the 
concepts of technical efficiency and metric distances (Briec, 1998).  
The Hölder norms q    1,q   are defined over a g-dimensional real normed 
space as follows: 
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(38) 
 
where  1,..., ggZ z z R  . From (38), Briec (1998) define the Hölder distance function 
for firm k with vector of inputs and outputs  ,k kX Y  as follows: 
             ,, inf , , : ,q k k k k qX YD X Y X Y X Y X Y T . (39) 
Model (39) minimizes the distance from  ,k kX Y  to the weakly efficient frontier of 
the technology, denoted as   T , and is interpreted as a measure of technical 
inefficiency. Other related paper where Hölder distance functions have also been used 
linked to the weakly efficient frontier is Briec and Lesourd (1999).  
After introducing some notation and definitions, we are ready to show that we can 
derive a difference-form measure of profit inefficiency from a duality result proven in Briec 
and Lesourd (1999).  
Proposition 1. Let  ,k kX Y  an input-output vector in T. Let t  be the dual space 
of q  with 1 1 1q t  . Then,  
     
 
            
 , 1 1, inf , : , 1, 0 , 0q
s m
k k T r rk i ik m stD H r i
D X Y D H h y d x D H D H . 
Proof. See Proposition 3.2 in Briec and Lesourd (1999). ■ 
By Proposition 1, it is obvious that if the input-output market prices  ,W P  are such 
that   , 1tW P , then    
 
      
 
1 1
, ,
q
s m
T r rk i ik k k
r i
W P p y w x D X Y . We are then 
capable of obtaining the usual difference-form measure of profit inefficiency in the left- 
hand side of the inequality and the Hölder distance function in the right hand side, 
showing that it is possible to decompose overall inefficiency through  ,
q
k kD X Y . 
However, as with the previous proposals (8) and (32), profit inefficiency must be 
normalized (deflated) in order to obtain an appropriate measuresee Aparicio et al. 
(2016). Accordingly, we propose the following solution, which was proved in Aparicio et 
al. (2017a). 
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Proposition 2. Let  ,k kX Y  an input-output vector in T. Let t  be the dual space 
of q  with 1 1 1q t  . Let  , m sW P R  . Then, 
  
      
 
   
 
      
 
1 1
,
,
, q
s m
T r rk i ik
r i
k k
t
W P w y p x
D X Y
W P
. 
 
(40) 
 
 
As before, departing from (40), and assuming variable returns to scale, profit 
inefficiency for firm k can be decomposed as follows:  
 
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Considering shadow prices8 rather than market prices when evaluating firm l with 
respect to firm k, we obtain: 
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.   (42) 
Then, aggregating all profit cross-inefficiencies through the arithmetic mean yields 
the new profit cross-efficiency measured based on the Hölder distance function: 
     
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* * * *
1 1
* *
1
,
1,
,
s m
v k k rk rl ik iln
r i
v l l
k k k t
V U u y v x
HCI X Y
n V U
 

     
 
 ,       (43) 
which, once again, can be decomposed as (41), thereby obtaining  
        

   * *
1
1, , , ; ,q
q
n
v l l k k V l l k k
k
HCI X Y D X Y AI X Y V U
n
.          (44) 
4. Extensions of economic cross-(in)efficiency to panel data 
We now briefly introduce extensions of the economic cross-efficiency models related 
to panel data with the aim of comparing the evolution of firms’ performance over time. 
                                               
8 These shadow prices come from the optimization model that appears in Proposition 1.  
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To this end, we rely on two proposals related to the Farrell (cost) and Nerlovian (profit) 
approaches. For the former, Maniadakis and Thanassoulis (2004) introduce the so-
called cost Malmquist index: 
    
 
 
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(45) 
 
where the superscripts t and t+1 denote two different periods of time. 
If we translate (45) to the cross-efficiency context considering shadow prices (those 
associated with the radial model in DEA), we get the following: 
    
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(46) 
In this way, we can introduce and decompose the cost Malmquist cross-efficiency 
index for firm l  as the geometric mean of   1 1, ; ,t t t tc l l l lCM X Y X Y k  for all k : 
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 (47) 
where Fl  is a mix of technological, allocative efficiency and price changes over time. 
For the Nerlovian cross-efficiency approach, Juo et al. (2015) define the change of 
normalized profit inefficiency from period t to period t+1, and propose its decomposition 
into different sources. In particular, these authors introduce a profit-Luenberger indicator: 
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(48) 
 
Accordingly, this definition can be reformulated for firm l  in terms of the shadow 
prices of firm k  (those related to the directional distance function), thereby obtaining: 
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(49) 
 
and the final profit-Luenberger cross-inefficiency indicator for firm l  is defined as: 
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(50) 
 
 
Following Juo et al. (2015), TL  can be decomposed into several components, 
mainly a Luenberger productivity indicator, which ultimately corresponds to a profit-
based Bennet quantity indicator, and a price change term incorporating allocative 
inefficiency (see Balk, 2018). Likewise, the Luenberger productivity indicator may be 
decomposed into efficiency change and technical change. In particular, efficiency 
change coincides with the difference       1 1 1, ; , , ; ,t t t x y t t t x yT l l l l T l l l lDDF X Y G G DDF X Y G G . In 
this way, the profit-Luenberger cross-inefficiency for firm l  would be decomposed into 
the change experienced by the DEA self-appraisal scores, the directional distance 
function value for firm l  in times t and t+1, and a (shadow) correction factor Nl : 
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(51) 
 
As for other panel data economic cross-(in)efficiency models that can be related to 
existing literature, we note that a profitability efficiency change measure based on 
shadow prices, i.e.,  , ;c l lPCE X Y , can be defined in terms of the Fisher index following 
Zofío and Prieto (2006). Also, following Aparicio et al. (2017b), it is possible to define a 
profit efficiency change measure using the economic cross-inefficiency model based on 
the weighted additive distance function  , ; ,v l l l lWACI X Y A B alternative to the profit 
Luenberger indicator in (49). 
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5. Numerical examples: An application to banking data.  
To illustrate the new cross-(in)efficiency measures and their empirical 
implementation, we rely on a database on 20 Iranian branch banks observed in 2001, 
previously used by Akbarian (2015) to present a novel model that ranks observations 
combining cross-efficiency and analytic hierarchy process (AHP) methods. The 
database was compiled originally by Amirteimoori and Kordrostami (2005), who discuss 
the statistical sources and selected variables. Following these authors, the production 
process is characterized by three inputs and three outputs. Inputs are: I.1) number of 
staff (personnel); I.2), number of computer terminals; and I.3) branch size (square meters 
of premises). On the output side the following variables are considered: O.1) deposits; 
O.2) amount of loans; and O.3) amount of charge. All output variables are stated in ten 
million of current Iranian Rials. The complete (normalized) dataset can be found in 
Amirteimoori and Kordrostami (2005:689), while Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics 
for all these variables. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for inputs and outputs, 2001. 
 Inputs Outputs 
 Staff 
(#) 
Computer 
Terminals 
(#) 
Space 
(m2) Deposits Loans Charge 
Average 0.738 0.713 0.368 0.191 0.549 0.367 
Median 0.752 0.675 0.323 0.160 0.562 0.277 
Minimum 0.372 0.550 0.120 0.039 0.184 0.049 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Stand. Dev. 0.160 0.138 0.207 0.200 0.261 0.257 
 
Source: Amirteimoori and Kordrostami (2005). 
 
In the empirical application, we illustrate the most representative multiplicative and 
additive models of economic cross-efficiency. In particular the Farrell cost model based 
on the (inverse) of the input distance function, the profit approach based on the 
directional distance function (Nerlove), the weighted additive distance function, and the 
Hölder distance function, as well as the profitability definition based on the generalized 
distance function. We leave the Farrell revenue model and panel data implementations 
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of the cost Malmquist index and profit Luenberger indicator as exercises to the interested 
readers.  
5.1 Farrell (cost) and Nerlovian (profit) economic cross-efficiency 
For comparison purposes, we calculate the economic cross-efficiency scores 
corresponding to the Farrell (cost) and the Nerlovian (profit) economic definitions 
introduced by Aparicio and Zofío (2019). In the first set of columns of Table 2, under the 
‘Technical (in)efficiency – Distance functions’ heading, we report the results for the 
original Farrell input oriented model that radially measures technical efficiency for bank 
k as in (1), but allowing for variable returns to scale (VRS) i.e.,  ,v l lITE X Y see Ali and 
Seiford (1993) for the multiplier formulation of the program. The ranking of banks in the 
left column is precisely based on these values, which serves us as benchmark. As many 
as 12 banks (60% of the observations) are technically efficient, exemplifying the poor 
discriminatory power of conventional DEA models in small samples and the need for 
cross-efficiency methods.9 The duality between the cost function and the (inverse) of the 
input distance function allows to introduce the bilateral cost cross-efficiency of firm l using 
the shadow prices of firm k, expression (5). Taking the arithmetic mean of all bilateral 
cross-inefficiencies yields the Farrell cross-efficiency measure (6),  ,v l lFCE X Y , which 
is reported in the first (leftmost) column of the second group of results under the heading 
‘Economic cross (in)-efficiencies’. Here, it is interesting to remark that despite the use of 
cross-efficiency methods several banks are still tied in the first place with a cost cross-
efficiency score of one. Finally, the difference between the cost based economic cross-
efficiency measure and the input technical efficiency corresponds to the (average) of the 
allocative inefficiencies obtained for the n shadow prices:  

 *
1
1 , ;
n
F
v l l k
k
AE X Y V
n
, (7). The 
values are reported once again in the first (left) column of the third group of results under 
the heading ‘Allocative (in)efficiency’. Comparing technical and allocative efficiencies, 
we observe that the second component is a comparatively larger source of inefficiency.  
The second set of results reported in Table 2 corresponds to the Nerlovian (profit) 
cross-efficiency. The values of the directional distance function under variable returns to 
scale,   , ; ,x yv k kD X Y G G  are calculated with the customary choice of directional vector 
corresponding to the observed input and output quantities,    , ,x y l lG G X Y . We see 
                                               
9 The number of technically efficient banks reduces to 7 under constant returns to scale, the 
standard assumption in the cross-efficiency literature.    
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that the same 12 bank are efficient and that the ranking for the inefficient observations 
is almost the same, except for banks #18 and #6, whose position is reversed. On this 
occasion, based on the duality between the profit function and the directional distance 
function we can define the bilateral cross-inefficiency measure (12), and aggregating all 
bilateral cross-inefficiencies through the arithmetic mean yields the Nerlovian profit 
cross-inefficiency,  , ; ,x yv l lNCI X Y G G  in (13), which is reported in the second column of 
the second group of results. Contrary to the Farrell cost cross-efficiency, none of the 
banks are Nerlovian cross-efficient. As before, the difference between profit cross-
inefficiency and the technical efficiency score of the bank under evaluation (represented 
by the directional distance function), yields the average of allocative inefficiencies:  
 


 
* *
1
1 , ; , ; ,
n
N x y
v l l k k
k
AI X Y V U G G
n
 in (14). In this model, allocative inefficiency is almost the 
sole responsible of overall economic cross-inefficiency on average.   
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Table 2. Economic cross-efficiency decompositions.  
  Technical (in)efficiency  Distance functions Economic cross-(in)efficiency Allocative (in)efficiency 
Ranking Bank 
ITEv 

F
vD  
G
cD  
G
vD  WAv qD  FCEv NCIv PCEc WADDv HCIv 
F
vAE  
N
vAI  
G
vAE  
W
vAI  qvAI  
(1) (10) (16) (16’) (33) (39) (6) (13) (19) (35) (43) (7) (14) (20) (37) (44) 
1 1 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.749 0.659 0.526 13.700 0.196 0.749 0.659 0.526 13.700 0.196 
2 3 1.000 0.000 0.991 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.522 0.670 8.998 0.160 1.000 0.522 0.676 8.998 0.160 
3 4 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.333 0.772 2.000 0.097 1.000 0.333 0.772 2.000 0.097 
4 7 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.330 0.864 2.943 0.091 1.000 0.330 0.864 2.943 0.091 
5 8 1.000 0.000 0.798 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.736 1.119 0.345 18.180 0.230 0.736 1.119 0.432 18.180 0.230 
6 9 1.000 0.000 0.789 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.979 1.071 0.529 9.153 0.155 0.979 1.071 0.670 9.153 0.155 
7 10 1.000 0.000 0.289 1.000 19.648 0.000 0.694 2.498 0.176 62.712 0.262 0.694 2.498 0.608 43.064 0.262 
8 12 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.502 0.791 4.024 0.125 1.000 0.502 0.791 4.024 0.125 
9 15 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.115 0.656 4.734 0.020 1.000 1.115 0.656 4.734 0.020 
10 17 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.932 0.625 12.500 0.173 1.000 0.932 0.625 12.500 0.173 
11 19 1.000 0.000 0.408 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.896 2.500 0.257 17.575 0.214 0.896 2.500 0.628 17.575 0.214 
12 20 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.916 0.582 0.649 8.040 0.134 0.916 0.582 0.649 8.040 0.134 
13 2 0.969 0.024 0.833 0.952 1.732 0.012 0.711 0.521 0.490 19.946 0.224 0.733 0.497 0.588 18.214 0.212 
14 5 0.927 0.043 0.899 0.918 2.556 0.018 0.796 0.596 0.617 8.016 0.181 0.859 0.553 0.686 5.460 0.163 
15 13 0.923 0.052 0.817 0.901 2.036 0.028 0.788 0.681 0.574 8.280 0.191 0.853 0.629 0.703 6.244 0.163 
16 18 0.896 0.104 0.473 0.802 9.951 0.060 0.767 2.026 0.303 25.732 0.224 0.856 1.922 0.639 15.781 0.164 
17 6 0.882 0.096 0.748 0.820 1.572 0.052 0.739 0.506 0.556 9.528 0.179 0.838 0.410 0.744 7.956 0.127 
18 16 0.813 0.146 0.639 0.738 3.459 0.071 0.665 0.914 0.392 12.140 0.253 0.818 0.768 0.613 8.681 0.182 
19 11 0.796 0.151 0.604 0.731 2.446 0.072 0.678 0.826 0.414 9.414 0.243 0.852 0.675 0.685 6.968 0.171 
20 14 0.695 0.281 0.470 0.535 4.843 0.168 0.576 0.914 0.350 16.157 0.288 0.829 0.633 0.746 11.314 0.120 
 Average 0.945 0.045 0.788 0.920 2.412 0.024 0.835 0.957 0.528 13.689 0.182 0.880 0.912 0.665 11.276 0.158 
 Median 1.000 0.000 0.825 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.792 0.754 0.543 9.471 0.186 0.858 0.646 0.663 8.840 0.163 
 Minimum 0.695 0.000 0.289 0.535 0.000 0.000 0.576 0.330 0.176 2.000 0.020 0.694 0.330 0.432 2.000 0.020 
 Maximum 1.000 0.281 1.000 1.000 19.648 0.168 1.000 2.500 0.864 62.712 0.288 1.000 2.500 0.864 43.064 0.262 
 Stand. Dev. 0.088 0.075 0.232 0.130 4.736 0.043 0.142 0.649 0.186 13.038 0.066 0.103 0.654 0.095 9.003 0.054 
 
     Source:  Own elaboration. 
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One wonders if the previously observed similarity in the technical efficiency rankings 
based on the input and directional distance functions extends to their respective 
economic cross-(in)efficiencies. As shown in Table 3, the Spearman rank correlation 
between these results turns out to be rather low:       , , , ; ,x yv l l v l lFCE X Y NCI X Y G G   
 0.3131, not being statistically significant at the usual levels of confidence. The low 
correlation would be expected, as this simply shows how different rankings can be 
depending on the cross-(in)efficiency models that are compared. In particular whether (i) 
they correspond to a multiplicative or additive definition of economic efficiency, and 
whether (ii) they are based on a partial dimension of the production process and 
corresponding economic objective (e.g., input orientation and cost minimization), versus 
a complete characterization that takes into account both inputs and outputs and a 
maximizing profit behavior. In this case the Farrell and Nerlovian economic cross-
efficiency models differ in both aspects, and therefore a weak correlation could be 
anticipated. 
Table 3. Rank correlations of cross-(in)efficiencies. Spearman coefficients. 
 FCEv (6) NCIv (13) PCEc (19) WADDv (35) HCIv (43) 
FCEv 1.0000     
NCIv 0.3133 1.0000    
PCEc 0.7909* 0.7499* 1.0000   
WADDv 0.6713* 0.6431* 0.8932* 1.0000  
HCIv 0.9170* 0.5004* 0.8853* 0.8101* 1.0000 
 
Notes: Correlations calculated once the (additive) economic cross-inefficiency scores are multiplied by 
-1, so the rankings are based on the same numerical interpretation, i.e., the greater the value, the higher 
the position in the ranking; * p-value < 0.01. 
 
Source: Own elaboration    
 
5.2 New measures of economic cross-(in)efficiency 
Subsequently, in the third column of the first group of results in Table 2, we find the 
generalized distance function,  , ;Gc k kD X Y  in (16), representing the technical part of 
the profitability cross-efficiency model,  , ;c l lPCE X Y  in (19). To obtain these results 
we have chosen    0.5, a value that weights equally inputs and outputs when projecting 
the banks to the production frontier and therefore is neutral. Both the technical and 
economic cross-efficiency scores corresponding to this multiplicative approach are 
significantly lower than those reported for the Farrell cost cross-efficiency model. The 
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reason is that profitability cross-efficiency is measured under the constant returns to 
scale (CRS) characterization of the production technology, while the rest of cross-
efficiencies allow for VRS. Thus, the efficiency scores are smaller in the profitability 
model. This difference can be attributed to scale inefficiencies. For this reason we 
present in the fourth column the directional distance function under variables returns to 
scale,  , ;Gv k kD X Y . This allows calculation of the magnitude of the scale efficiency as 
 , ;G k kSE X X       , ; / , ;G Gc k k v k kD X X D X X . On average, scale inefficiency is 
0.8565, which means that if banks were to produce at one of the most productive scale 
sizes (Banker et al., 1984), they could yield about 15% more quantity of outputs with a 
similar reduction in the quantity of inputs employed. Also, looking at the subset of 12 
banks that are efficient under VRS, as many as 5 are scale inefficient (#3, #8, #9, #10 
and #19). Moving on to profitability cross-efficiency,  , ;c l lPCE X Y  is reported in the 
third column of the second group of results. Despite the fact that the profit cross-
efficiency takes into account both the input and output dimensions of the production 
process, its ranking of banks correlates positively with that corresponding to the Farrell 
cost definition, showing the compatibility of these two multiplicative measures in the 
current application:      , , , ;v l l c l lFCE X Y PCE X Y   0.7909statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Completing the results for this measure, the ratio of the profitability cross-
efficiency measure to the generalized distance function corresponds to the allocative 
efficiency factor,  

 
 
 

1/
* *
1
, ; , ;
nn
G
c k k k k
j
AE X Y V U  in (20), presented in the third column of 
the third group of results. Looking at the average of the technical and allocative 
components, the weight of the latter term is relatively larger than the former (as in the 
multiplicative Farrell cost model).   
We now focus on the last two alternative definitions of profit cross-inefficiency based 
on the duality between the profit function and either the weighted additive distance 
function and the Hölder distance functions, respectively. The results corresponding to 
the former,  , ; ,v k k k kWA X Y A B  in (33), are shown in the fifth column of the first group of 
results. Because of its different normalization constraint, its values are significantly larger 
than those observed for thealso additivedirectional distance function 
  , ; ,x yv k kD X Y G G , with bank #10 performing rather poorly. The values of the profit cross-
inefficiency corresponding to this model,  , ; ,v l l l lWACI X Y A B  in (35), can be found in 
the fourth column of the second group of results, while its associated allocative 
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inefficiency in the same column of the third group of results, i.e., 
 

 * *
1
1 , ; , ; ,
n
W
V l l k k l l
k
AI X Y V U A B
n
 in (37). 
As for the Hölder distance function,  ,
q
k kD X Y  in (39), underlying the last definition 
of profit cross-inefficiency, we choose as reference the infinitum norm,  see Aparicio 
et al. (2016). This makes this function equal to the directional distance function when the 
directional vector is unit-valued, i.e.,    , 1,1x yG G . For that reason, the results can be 
readily compared to those previously reported for the directional distance function: 
  , ; ,x yv k kD X Y G G  with    , ,x y l lG G X Y . This also extends to the comparison between 
the Hölder and Nerlovian profit cross-inefficiencies. The results for the Hölder distance 
function are reported in the last (rightmost) column of the first group of results, with the 
12 technically efficient banks exhibiting, once again, zero-valued scores. Finally, the 
Hölder cross-inefficiency scores,  ,v l lHCI X Y  in (43), and its corresponding allocative 
inefficiencies,  

 * *
1
1 , ; ,q
n
V l l k k
k
AI X Y V U
n
 in (44), are shown in the last (rightmost) columns 
of the second and third group of results, respectively. As in the Nerlovian profit model, 
the allocative component is the main source of inefficiency.    
The compatibility between rankings resulting from the same economic efficiency 
definition (i.e., profit) are rather high, with the Spearman correlations in the range set by 
     , ; , , ,x yv l l v l lNCI X Y G G HCI X Y   0.5004 and      , ; , , ,v v l lWA X Y A B HCI X Y   
0.8101both statistically significant as identified in Table 3. Scanning through all 
coefficients, it is the ranking based on the profitability cross-inefficiency the one with the 
higher correlations with either its multiplicative or additive alternatives. This is a relevant 
result since the profitability ranking is based on constant returns to scale while its 
alternatives are created under the assumption of variable returns. This suggests that the 
rankings are not significantly affected by the existence of scale inefficiencies. On the 
other side, it seems that it is the ranking based on the Nerlovian profit cross-inefficiency 
the one that correlates less with any of its alternatives. Also, and rather surprisingly, the 
rankings from the multiplicative, partially oriented, Farrell (cost) cross-efficiency, and the 
additive Hölder (profit) cross-inefficiency are those presenting the highest (and 
significant) correlation:      , , ,v l l v l lFCE X Y HCI X Y   0.9170. The relative values for 
the technical and allocative inefficiencies follow the exact same pattern that in the 
previous Nerlovian and weighted additive models.   
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6. Summary and conclusions 
This study extends the existing definitions of economic cross-(in)efficiency proposed 
by Aparicio and Zofío (2019) by introducing a new set of multiplicative and additive 
measures that can be obtained from the duality relationship between alternative 
representations of economic behavior and their distance function technological 
counterparts. Economic cross-(in)efficiency measures the performance of firms in terms 
of a set of reference prices that could correspond to either market prices, shadow prices 
or any other imputed prices. When market prices are available, it can be shown that for 
homothetic technologies, the process of benchmarking corresponds to the usual 
economic efficiency definitions, e.g., à la Farrell regarding cost efficiency or à la Nerlove 
in the case of profit inefficiency. However, mirroring cross-inefficiency methods, it is 
possible to adapt this framework by considering the complete set of shadow prices that 
are obtained when evaluating the technical efficiency of all firms within the sample. This 
overall economic measure can be interpreted as the capability of firms to behave 
optimally by reaching minimum cost or maximum profit for a wide range of prices. The 
new methodology is particularly relevant in studies where market prices are not readily 
available because of the institutional framework (e.g., public services such as education, 
health, safety, etc.), but yet a robust ranking of observations based on their performance 
is demanded by decision makers and stakeholders.  
The combination of the economic and cross-efficiency literatures solves some of the 
weaknesses of the standard approaches based on DEA for ranking observations, as 
when there is a large set of them that are technically efficient, resulting in ties for the first 
place. Cross-efficiency methods were introduced in part to solve that drawback, yet they 
have been only applied under the assumption of constant returns to scale because of 
the negative scores that may be obtained when the technology is characterized by 
variable returns to scale. The economic cross-(in)efficiency methodology solves this 
problem in a natural way, without proposing ad-hoc methods such as those based on 
data translations (Lim and Zhu, 2015). Also, recent critics raised against cross-efficiency 
methods regarding the (unrealistic) interpretation of the DEA multipliers as sensible 
shadow prices (Førsund, 2018a, 2018b), can now be addressed under the new 
paradigm, since they can be understood as actual realizations of possible market prices.   
To be consistent in the definition of economic cross-(in)efficiency, a duality 
relationship between a supporting economic function and its corresponding distance 
function is required. This allows the decomposition in a subsequent stage of economic 
cross-efficiencies into technical efficiency (the actual value of the distance function) and 
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a residual defined as either the arithmetic or geometric mean of the allocative 
(in)efficiency residuals. Following this scheme, we introduce two new multiplicative 
definitions of economic cross-efficiency. The first one relates the profitability function, 
defined as the ratio of revenue to costs (Georgescu-Roegen, 1951), and the generalized 
distance function (Chavas and Cox, 1999). The second one can be seen as a particular 
case of the former that relates the revenue function and the output distance function 
(Shephard, 1953)just as the Farrell cost cross-efficiency approach. We also present 
two alternative additive definitions of economic cross-inefficiencies based in the duality 
between the profit function and either the weighted additive distance function (Cooper et 
al., 2011), or the Hölder distance function (Briec and Lesourd, 1999). In passing we note 
that these two distance functions are particular cases of the loss function introduced by 
Aparicio et al. (2016), which could be eventually used to develop the most general model 
of economic cross-inefficiency. All these and previous models of economic cross-
efficiency correspond to a cross-sectional evaluation of performance, but they can be 
extended to panel data. In this case the change on cost efficiency over time can be 
combined with our proposed reinterpretation of cross-efficiency methods to yield, thereby 
obtained the counterpart to the so-called cost-Malmquist (Maniadakis and Thanassoulis, 
2004) and profit-Luenberger indicators (Juo et al., 2015). Following the same procedure 
these variations can be decomposed into quantity productivity indices or indicators, and 
a residual capturing the role played by changes in prices (i.e., allocative efficiency 
change) and technological change.          
We show also that the new models can be implemented empirically using DEA 
techniques. For this we rely on a database of financial institutions previously used in the 
cross-efficiency literature. The results show the suitability of adopting the economic 
cross-(in)efficiency approach to rank observations according to their productive 
performance, and its decomposition into its technical and allocative sources. For this 
particular application, we find that results are in general compatible across models 
(particularly for the relative weight of technical and allocative (in)efficiencies), resulting 
in rather high Spearman correlations. This result is also observed for models that are 
quite dissimilar in principle; i.e., those based on a partial orientation such as the Farrell 
cost cross-efficiency and the input distance function, and a complete characterization of 
the production process based on the profit function and the Hölder distance function. 
Nevertheless, the correlation between the former and the Nerlovian economic cross-
efficiency is in turn the lowest across all models. This shows that, as with any efficiency 
and productivity study, the choice of the appropriate reference model is critical when 
assessing performance.    
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We conclude suggesting some paths for further research related to both the 
economic efficiency and the cross-efficiency literature that could be brought to the new 
models of economic cross-efficiency. Regarding the former, it is well known that if 
technologies are non-homothetic, the standard decompositions of economic efficiency 
fail to correctly characterize technical and allocative inefficiency. Within the non-DEA 
approach Aparicio et al. (2015) show that, for non-homothetic technologies, the radial 
contractions (expansions) of the input (output) vectors resulting in efficiency gains do not 
maintain allocative (in)efficiency constant along the firm’s projection to the production 
frontier (isoquants). This implies that they cannot be solely interpreted as technical 
efficiency reductions. From the perspective of, for example, the Farrell cost efficiency 
decomposition in this study, this result invalidates the residual nature of allocative 
efficiency, and justifies the use of flexible distance functions (i.e., directional, weighted 
additive, Hölder, etc.) with a choice of directional vector capable of keeping allocative 
efficiency constant along the projections. As for cross-efficiency, it is well-known that 
there exist alternative optima for the DEA models, which may result in different cross-
efficiency scores. To overcome this situation, weights restrictions could be employed as 
suggested by Ramón et al. (2010). Yet another possibility is the adoption of secondary 
goals such as the so-called benevolent and aggressive approaches proposed by Sexton 
et al. (1986) and Doyle and Green (1994). See also Liang et al. (2008a) and Lim (2012) 
for further refinements. It is also possible to adopt a game cross efficiency approach as 
in Liang et al. (2008b). All these are relevant qualifications and natural extensions that 
would result in the consolidation and improvement of cross-efficiency methods, making 
their diffusion to wider audiences more likely. 
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